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1. Introduction
In 1965 a new penal code was enacted in Sweden, a code that in itself was a manifestation 
of the rehabilitative ideals hold over Swedish crime policy. After more than thirty years of 
inquiries and reforms, the new code became a validation of individual prevention as the 
rationale for adjudication. Substantiating a rehabilitative ideal claim over crime policy, 
the penal law was in consequence framed as something that was there to facilitate the 
offender’s readjustment to society. Nonetheless, within just a few years, the individual 
preventive reasoning and rationale of the code, as well as a crime policy built on the reha-
bilitative ideal, would come under harsh scholarly criticism. Set in motion was a process 
that, in less than twenty-four years, would see the abandonment of an individual preven-
tive rationale in the penal code, replacing it with a retributive rationale built on what was 
conceptualised as penal value.
The effects of the downfall of the rehabilitative ideal during the 1970s has been ei-
ther the starting point of or the framework for many analyses of crime policy in the last 
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decades.1A turn to a repressive crime policy, mostly analysed in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
has also become a most common theme. Claims of a so-called punitive turn or of a pe-
nal populism are frequent when it comes to studies on crime policy. 2 In these somewhat 
dichotomised explanations, John Pratt launches an even more dichotomising conceptu-
alisation claiming that, contrary to penal populism and a punitive turn dominating the 
Anglo-Saxon world, there is also a Scandinavian exceptionalism. This exceptionalism 
manifests itself in terms of lenient sentences, low imprisonment rates and in a general 
tolerance towards crime and criminals framed as a sort of ‘manifest destiny’ of the social 
democratic welfare states of Scandinavia.3 Still one could argue that the many conceptu-
alisations of punitiveness and penal populism remain mainly undefined, resulting in a 
situation wherein much of the related analysis is vague, and the historical developments 
that are to be clarified are asserted rather than explained.4 
The object of this study is to contribute to a more empirically expounded trajectory 
of Swedish crime policy during the formative years of the 1970s to the early 1990s. Since 
there are few studies directly addressing the topic of the downfall of the rehabilitative ide-
al, one of the objects of this paper is to examine the scholarly critique that paved the way 
for the downfall of the rehabilitative ideal within Swedish crime policy. A second object 
is to look at the consequence of this downfall for Swedish crime policy. One argument 
made in this paper is that the downfall was not simply brought about as a logical conse-
quence of the failure of the rehabilitative ideal as such, but also as a consequence of a wide 
array of claims from scholars with different scientific rationales. At stake was the right to 
‘tell the truth’ about crime and criminals, and as a consequence, macro level sociological 
1 Two pivotal studies are Garland, Culture of control: crime and social order in contemporary 
society (Oxford University Press 2001) and Simon, Governing through crime: how the war on 
crime transformed American democracy and created a culture of fear (Oxford University Press 
2007). Garland´s study has paved the way for many more, and through his work with the journal 
Punishment and Society Garland has more or less established crime policy studies as a field of 
its own. But crime policy studies also have a lengthier heritage and studies like Cohen, Visions 
of social control: crime, punishment and classification (Polity Press 1985), Rothman, Conscience 
and convenience: the asylum and its alternatives in progressive America (Little Brown 1980) and 
Garland, Punishment and welfare: a history of penal strategies (Gower 1985) are all part of it. The 
focus in much of the work on crime policy has been on punishment and the prison and Foucault, 
Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison (Vintage Books 1977) is often considered to be a 
major influence.
2 Garland 2001 and Pratt, Penal populism (Routledge 2007) are two major proponents of these 
theses.
3 Pratt’s claim of a Scandinavian exceptionalism has been severely challenged by Scandinavian 
researchers. See Ugelvik and Dullum (eds.), Penal exceptionalism?: Nordic prison policy and 
practice (Routledge 2012).
4 Matthews, The myth of punitiveness, Theoretical Criminology (2005) pp. 175-201. Meyer and 
O’Malley are also sceptical of the many rather sloppy claims made about general occurrence of 
an all-embracing punitive turn. See Meyer and O’Malley, Missing the Punitive Turn? Canadian 
Criminal Justice, ‘Balance’ and Penal Modernism (Sydney University 2009).
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perspectives pushed out micro level medical-psychiatric explanations, while the juridical 
rationale saw a move from individual prevention to a just desert rationale. 
A second argument made in this paper is that the downfall had effects on the political 
legitimacy of crime policy and thus also on the political field of crime policy. Losing the 
scientific legitimacy of individual prevention meant that legitimacy came to be upheld by 
politicians appealing to what is termed the general sense of justice. This restructuring of 
the field of crime policy in turn made it politically possible to launch policies that coun-
tered empirical findings made by criminology.  
2. Theoretical and Methodological Starting Point
The theoretical and methodological framework of this paper builds on the Foucauldian 
concepts of governmentality and genealogy.5 Governmentality is a conceptual framework 
that Foucault developed in relation to the question of power and the state. In the work 
prior to the work on governmentality Foucault criticized a conceptualisation of power as 
repression, claiming instead that power was relational and productive and something pri-
marily applied through interactions like teaching, reforming delinquents or performing 
diagnoses. Being criticized for omitting the workings of the state Foucault developed his 
ideas on governmentality. Governmentality focuses on the governing of life and the pop-
ulation, and explores the different forms governing may take. Just as with his critique of 
power as negative and repressive, governmentality builds on historicising and dissecting 
that which we take for granted and in this case it was the notions of the liberal democracy 
as a natural fact. Instead of taking liberalism as an ideology on what good government 
is Foucault frames liberalism as a governmentality – a way of governing combining both 
a conceptualisation of what is to be governed, as well as a conceptualisation of how to 
govern. Liberalism is also what Foucault see as a governing from a distance, a governing 
that works through the regulation of life by way of recommendations and thus governing 
is to structure the field of possible actions. Governing works through problematisation 
as a practice, it is by way of articulating problems and through finding the subsequent 
solution to these problems that governing works. Defining and thus knowing the prob-
lem is important since it incorporates producing that which is to be governed while at the 
same times producing ways of governing. The scientific knowledge of criminology and 
jurisprudence thus includes the creation of that which is to be governed, the criminal, as 
well as the knowledge on how to best govern this object. 
5 The major work of Foucault when it comes to genealogy is Discipline and punish and when it 
comes to governmentality; The history of sexuality. Vol. 1: The will to knowledge (Penguin 1990).
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Pivotal to governing are two things: bio-politics and the population. As pointed out 
above, Foucault was criticised for not dealing with the state, but bio-politics is part of his 
analysis of the ‘state’ in the sense that the technique of discipline that Foucault highlights 
in Discipline and Punishment, a technique targeting the individual, at macro level is re-
placed by bio-politics and bio-power. Bio-politics addresses the population and its health 
and vitality; it is a politics of life focusing on the care and promotion of the population as 
the primary economic resource of the nation. Contrary to the rule of the sovereign, a rule 
that builds on the right over life, which manifests itself in the right to take life, bio-politics 
is a politics of life, controlling life and its existence for the good of the nation. Modern 
crime policy, criminology and rule of law are all part of this liberal governmentality and 
bio-politics, and the rehabilitative ideal and penal welfarism are prime examples thereof. 
The major rationale behind the rehabilitative ideal and its different expressions, like von 
Liszt’s conceptualisation of the criminal as three distinct types, is a governing of the pop-
ulation aiming to maximise the usefulness of said population. Subsequently, the critique 
of the rehabilitative ideal and its consequences become analysable in terms of govern-
mentality: What rationale of governing takes shape as a consequence of the downfall of 
the rehabilitative ideal and the succeeding crime policy-reformation?
Methodologically the paper explores the historical pedigree of present-day crime pol-
icy in Sweden, not as a linear development in terms of given ‘origins’, but as plural and 
sometimes contradictory pasts that reveal traces of the influence that power has had on 
truth. The downfall of the rehabilitative ideal has come to shape how we do and think 
about crime policy in Sweden today. But this history is not a pre-given one determined 
by ‘historical facts and conditions’, it is rather a contingent history – a certain way of 
assembling the trajectory of present-day views on crime policy. Theoretically and meth-
odologically, this paper aims to do a genealogy, thus tracing the pedigrees of present-day 
conceptions of crime policy in a contingent history where power-relations shape the tra-
jectory of said history. Doing a genealogy is doing a particular investigation into those 
elements that seem to be without history, or rather, are framed as being without history. 
The nexus of crime policy and criminological and jurisprudential knowledge often take 
this non-historical shape, framing itself instead as a natural reaction to the phenomena 
of crime.
The empirical material used in the paper consists of on the one hand of government 
bills, public inquiries and other reports and material produced by the Swedish govern-
ment and the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen). On the other hand, the study uses pub-
lications made by researchers in the fields of criminology, penal law and crime policy 
addressing the question of crime and crime policy in Sweden and/or other relevant coun-
tries.
The paper consist of two parts. Part I takes as its aim explaining the scholarly critique 
of the rehabilitative ideal and how that unfolded over time. Part II looks to the political 
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reactions and framing of policy that evolved in relation to the scholarly critique, but also 
how a policy developed without the need for scientific support. However, the paper starts 
with a historical look at the rehabilitative ideal in Sweden.
3. The Rehabilitative Ideal in Sweden
During the decades following the Second World War the rehabilitative ideal had come 
to have a strong hold over Swedish crime policy. This was mainly due to the simultaneity 
of three factors; the establishing of a social democratic welfare state, the hegemony of a 
medically based criminology and a firm belief in a scientific crime policy that could be 
used as a means of social engineering. 
The hegemony of a medical criminology had much to do with the massive influence 
of Olof Kinberg (1873-1960). As a professor in psychiatry and a proponent of Lombro-
so’s theory, Kinberg not only pursued research and started institutes, but was also of-
ten consulted as an expert in most public inquiries concerning crime and penal policy 
during the mid-decades of the 20th century.6 Befriended with many politicians, amongst 
them the highly influential Karl Schlyter (1879-1959) who, apart from being a member 
of parliament for the social democrats, served as a minister of justice for a social demo-
cratic government in the years 1932-1936; Kinberg retained, for almost half a century, an 
unique position and opportunity to influence Swedish crime policy and the question on 
what should be seen as viable knowledge or not. Up to the 1960s Kinberg pretty much 
‘was’ criminology in Sweden.
Schlyter, assisted by Kinberg, was a firm believer of the possibility of a scientifically 
devised crime policy that should be used as a means of obliterating crime.7 And it was 
through his work with the so-called strafflagberedningen (the penal law committee), in 
which Schlyter engaged the scholars he saw as best fitted in the work of producing a 
scientific crime policy, that criminology got established as a scientific subject matter in 
Sweden. Through the workings of Ivar Agge, with the support of Schlyter, criminology 
during the 1950s and 1960s became a subject of its own, this leading up to a chair in 
criminology at Stockholm university.8 Agge’s, as well as Schlyter’s, view on criminology 
was as a multi-disciplined support subject to penal law studies, thus giving penal law an 
empirical content.9
6 Qvarsell, Utan vett och vilja. Om synen på brottslighet och sinnessjukdom (Carlssons 1993).
7 Sundell, Karl Schlyter - en biografi (Nordstedts 1998).
8 On the history of criminology in Sweden see Pedersson, En fängslande vetenskap?: Kriminologi i 
Sverige, 1885—1965 (Göteborgs universitet 2017).
9 See Agge, Den Kriminologiska vetenskapen in Kriminologi, eds. Agge et al.  (Wahlströn & 
Widstrand 1955).
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In reality, the rehabilitative ideal in Sweden would come to consist primarily of two 
practices: Firstly, an extensive use of coercive measures by applying administrative laws 
addressing social pathologies like drunkenness and so-called protective care of mal-
adapted children. Secondly, by the implementation of so-called prison industries.10 ‘First 
we build the factory, then we add the institution’11 was the manifestation of the rehabili-
tative ideal according to Torsten Eriksson, Head of the National Prisons and Probation 
Administration during the 1950s and 1960s. Reforming the culprit was thus installing a 
healthy work ethic and not much more.
A central aspect in the application of the exceedingly interventionist policy of the 
Swedish welfare state was the powers of the civil servant. Since Sweden is a civil law coun-
try, the work of public authorities and officials is governed by administrative law and by 
the courts. Social engineering in termers of forced custody or compulsory institutional 
care of those deemed unable to care for themselves in a proper way was governed by ad-
ministrative law and by the courts; a juridical order that placed the courts at the hands of 
the civil servants.
The influence of a positivistic criminology on Swedish crime policy was most mani-
fest in the question of liability. Accountability and legal responsibility was nothing more 
that metaphysical speculations – freedom of will was non-existent, thus punishing crimi-
nals because they were supposed to have acted in one way or another was ludicrous. This 
deterministic view of the culprit dominated the crime policy debate during the 1930s, 
40s and 50s and the ongoing revisions of the penal law were coloured by this kind of rea-
soning. However, it would be in the so-called Skyddslag that these ideas would cast their 
principal impression by proposing that, after the question of guilt was established, the 
choice of sanction should be settled by a committee of experts.12 Being one of two public 
inquiries behind the new penal code enacted in 1965, the proposal was not passed in its 
entirety. Instead it was paragraph 1:7 in the penal code that would come to regulate the 
choice of sanction as well as the severity of the sanction. The paragraph stated that ‘the 
choice of sanction should, observing what is needed to maintain a general law abidingness, 
pay attention to the fact that the sanction shall be fitted out as to facilitate re-adjustment to 
society of the convicted’.
10 Nilsson, Från cellfängelse till beteendeterapi. Fängelse, kriminalpolitik och vetande ca 1930–1980 
(Egalité 2013).
11 Eriksson, The Correctional System of Sweden, Third United Nations Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Stockholm 9–18.8.1965, 60.
12 SOU 1956:55, Skyddslag. This was also the final report produced by Strafflagberedningen and it 
meant the closure of a committee that had been working since 1938.
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4. Part I: Enter the Critics – Opposing the Rehabilitative Ideal 
Even though there had been a debate in the late 1950s concerning the importance, or 
rather the unimportance, of general prevention as penal theory, the rehabilitative ideal 
seemed to stand quite unchallenged in Sweden in the mid-1960s. The new penal code 
confirmed this hegemony. However, in Norway, the professor of sociology of law, Vil-
helm Aubert (1922-1988) and criminologist Nils Christie (1928-2015) had started to 
question the empirical claims surrounding the rehabilitative ideal.13 A legal criticism was 
also starting to build up in the Nordic countries led by the Norwegian professor of pe-
nal law, Johannes Andenæs (1912-2003), who had been arguing for a general preventive 
legitimisation of punishment instead of an individual preventive one.14 In 1967, Inkeri 
Antilla (1916-2013), a Finnish professor of penal law, published an article questioning 
a juridical reasoning based on individual prevention, claiming that it was juridical un-
sound since it focused on the actor and not on the act.15 Punishing the criminal and not 
the crime would amount to nothing more than speculations concerning future behaviour 
and could as a consequence not be the basis for sound legal reasoning.
The precursor of the critique of the rehabilitative ideal in Sweden consisted of a pris-
oners’ rights movement originating in 1966. The national association on the humaniza-
tion of correctional treatment, KRUM, was formed with the purpose of swaying public 
opinion on questions concerning Swedish correctional treatment, such as the use of in 
prison punishment like solitary confinement, hoping to persuade politicians to decrease 
the use of prisons.16 The KRUM-movement went on to inspire similar movements in 
Norway and Denmark, and even made an impact in the USA. Nonetheless, the critique 
emanating from the movement was originally not critical of the rehabilitative ideal as 
such, what was seen as the problem was rather the lack of treatment and the prison au-
thorities´ reliance on brute force.17
KRUM attacked the social democratic interpretation of the rehabilitative ideal. Crime 
and penal policy had been an important part of the efforts to reform society during the 
entire period of social democratic rule from 1932 and onwards.18 Within party politics 
the criticism delivered by KRUM on Swedish penal policy found a sounding board within 
13 Aubert, Om straffens sociala funksjon (Universitetsforlaget 1959); Christie, Tvangsarbeid og 
alkoholbruk (Universitetsforlaget 1961).
14 Andenæs, Punishment and deterrence (University of Michigan Press 1974).
15 Anttila, Konservativ och radikal kriminalpolitik i Norden, Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab 
(1967) pp. 237-251.
16 Andersson and Nilsson, Svensk kriminalpolitik (Liber 2017) pp. 110-112.
17 Nilsson 2013.
18 The social democrats had been in rule from 1932, and would be until 1976. This rule was either 
in coalition or by themselves.
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Folkpartiet19, and especially within their youth association. Quick to pick up on KRUM´s 
criticism of the prison, Folkpartiet used the criticism as a way to condemn the social dem-
ocratic welfare state.20 The criticism consisted in condemning the prison services, and 
especially the head of services, Torsten Eriksson (1906-1977), for not making the prisons 
and the workings of the prisons human and rehabilitative enough.
KRUM´s and Folkpartiet’s criticism of the prison system and the prison services was 
politically containable. By appointing a new head of the prisons services and a new min-
ister of justice, while at the same time approving a new legal regulation concerning the 
serving of prison sentences, the rehabilitative ideal and individual prevention was main-
tained as the basis for crime policy.21
4.1 The Penal Law as Class Law
What really sparked the downfall of the rehabilitative ideal was when the penal law was 
framed as a class law underpinning the class society.22 By connecting the criticism of the 
rehabilitative ideal to class struggle and by depicting penal policy as a means of uphold-
ing the class society, the critics could draw on and merge with the general leftist societal 
criticism going on at the late 1960s and early 1970s in Sweden. There was however a po-
litical dividing line among the critics – you either supported a belief in penal policy as a 
means to a better society through reform or you maintained the position that the current 
penal system had to be abandoned to make a better society. The latter standpoint built on 
stressing the importance of class aspects and the class society in explaining the existence 
of the prison and the rehabilitative ideal, demanding the abandonment of all that made 
the class society possible. The former did not object to the means as such, i.e. the welfare 
state – these critics believed that it was mainly the scientific knowledge and the medical 
rationale that was wrong and they were thus supporters of social engineering, thinking it 
possible to produce the perfect society by scientific means. The major argument against 
the rehabilitative ideal was that it fortified the class society by making the locking up of 
19 Folkpartiet is a centre-right party claiming adherence to the classical liberalism. During the late 
1960s and early 70s, the party, and especially its youth association, was liberal in the American 
sense of the word, becoming almost socialistic in some sense. Nowadays the party has turned to 
more law and order rhetoric’s pared with free-market liberalism, so-called neo-liberalism.
20 Nilsson 2013.
21 Lagen om kriminalvård i anstalt (Kval 1974:203).
22 The so-called clientele-movement, incorporating KRUM, seemed, at first sight, to have been 
strengthened by a Marxist perspective and Marxist ideas, but the question is if, as Mitchell Dean 
points out, whether all that the radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s really did accomplished 
were to pave the way for the neo-liberal criticism of the welfare state. Dean, Governmentality: 
Power and rule in modern society (Sage 1999) p. 155.
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the lumpenproletariat into sane political action.23 The penal law as class law was legiti-
mized by the rehabilitative ideal since it hid the fact that what really caused crime was an 
unjust society. The argument made was that: 
Laws aren’t politically neutral. Their formulation is dependent upon the power and class 
aspects of the society that upholds them. Many laws protect certain social classes’ inter-
ests. The privileged. Politically these laws can be unjust. But the realm of sickness and 
medicine doesn’t hold the concept of injustice. Sickness is a causal process: classless.24 
The medical rationale of the rehabilitative ideal hid societal and structural factors. 
Undetermined sentences, a pathological and individualistic explanation of crime, and 
differentiation of culprits according to their supposed need of treatment, were not logical 
outcomes of scientific progress and thus possible to verify empirically – they were ideo-
logical instruments used to further a society divided by class.25
The scholarly critique of the rehabilitative ideal took on two forms. On the one hand 
there was a juridical criticism, where the argument was that the rehabilitative ideals’ ju-
ridical application, individual prevention, was in conflict with the most fundamental legal 
principles such as equality before the law, predictability, and the principles of legality and 
proportionality. The second line of scholarly critique was an empirical one. Inspired by 
the work done by Aubert and Christie26 social scientists started to produce research that 
showed that individual prevention had no real effect.
Establishing the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, BRÅ, in 1974 came 
to amplify the critique of the rehabilitative ideal since many of the scholars joining the 
council were themselves critics of the ideal. The creation of BRÅ built on a belief in so-
cial engineering, and the launching of a national centre to coordinate the criminological 
research had been on the agenda since the 1940s. The fact that scholars critical to the 
rehabilitative ideal staffed BRÅ naturally had consequences, instead of supplementing 
existing policy the council questioned the policy pursued.27 
23 Elwin, Heckscher and Nelson, Den första stenen: Studiebok i kriminalpolitik (Tiden 1971).
24 Håkansson, Brott – sjukdom – social kontroll in Behandlings som straff: 23 debatt inlägg om 
nordisk kriminalpolitik, ed. Nestius (Verdandi 1969) p. 122. My translation.
25 Andersson, Kriminalpolitikens väsen (Stockholms universitet 2002) pp. 62-65.
26 Aubert 1959, Christie 1961.
27 Brå-rapport 1974:1, Symposium kring kriminalpolitik – 14-15 januari i Saltsjö-Boo (Stockholm 
1974); Brå-rapport 1974:3, Kriminalpolitiskt utvecklingsarbete (Stockholm 1974).
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4.2 The Legal Argumentation against Individual Prevention
Sanctioning the actor and not the act was what made individual prevention unjust and 
the legal scholars attacked what they saw as a mashing of a medical rationale based on 
clinical assessments, with a juridical rationale where the choice of sanction was not based 
on judicial reasoning, but on a medical one. The proposal from Skyddslag had been that 
the question of guilt should be decided by the court, while the questions concerning the 
sanction should be determined by medical experts; this due to the fact that criminals were 
pathological individuals in need of treatment.28 As mentioned, even though the proposal 
was not fully enacted, the new penal code still held a paragraph regulating the choice of 
sanction, making the choice of sanction into an individual preventive prognosis. What 
the legal scholars criticising the rehabilitative ideal wanted was an adjudication built on 
the competence and rationale of law as a science of its own. Amongst those capabilities 
were the abilities of asserting questions concerning guilt, intent, and responsibility.29
Individual prevention had to be abandoned due to the fact that there was scientifically 
‘true’ way of correcting prisoners existed. Penal interventions were punishment and not 
treatment, and as such the result of power relations and the use of power. Giving alle-
giance to the jurisprudence of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, the scholars claimed 
that the power of the state had to be limited. But promoting classicism also meant pro-
moting a jurisprudence that celebrated due process and proportionate punishment – the 
law should be, not an instrument for, but the limits of government. This line of argument 
was in itself also a criticism of social engineering. The proponents of a neoclassical school 
of law argued that the rule of law should be used as a means for limiting the power of the 
state.30
4.3 Individual Preventions’ Lack of Result
The second line of critique of the rehabilitative ideal was an empirical one, and in Sweden 
Bengt Börjesson’s studies initiated it all.31 However, looking more closely at the empirical 
criticism, one finds, as with the juridical critique, that the supporting structure of the 
disparagement is a different scientific rational: if the juridical critique built on framing 
legal reasoning as something inherently opposed to individual prevention, the empirical 
critique built on disqualifying the aetiology of individual prevention. 
28 SOU 1956: 55.
29 Andersson 2002 pp. 65-78.
30 Andersson 2002 pp. 66-72.
31 Börjesson, Om påföljders verkningar (Almqvist & Wiksell 1966); Börjesson and Ros, Straffets 
verkningar (Liber 1967). 
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If we really wanted to understand crime, the argument of the macro level criminol-
ogists was that we had to look to social, economic, structural and systemic factors. In 
conclusion, the most disturbing feature of the rehabilitative ideal was the assumption that 
crime was caused by individual pathology.
The idea that criminality is a sickness that necessitates treatment turns the attention 
towards the individual, while at the same time taking attention away from the society 
that moulds his problems. Unjust distribution of societal means, poor social heritage 
etc., easily go to background when criminality is viewed from a medical perspective.32
The empirical criticism built on claiming that the root causes of crime were social, 
structural and economic factors. At stake was both the right to speak the truth about 
crime as well as the means for dominating the crime policy field. Establishing a subject 
matter, a methodology or a perspective as the dominating one or as ‘the true expert sci-
ence’, in Sweden anyway, means that the researchers are given great leverage by being, 
amongst other things, those who are appointed as experts in public inquiries. In a discur-
sive perspective speaking the truth is a way of structuring the field of possible actions and 
in that sense, being the science or discipline that has the right to speak the truth, gives 
those dominating the field the possibility to ‘determine’ what is included or excluded, 
what is scientific knowledge and what is not.33
One interesting aspect is how crime as a political topic came to expand substantially 
once the confinement of the subject primarily to issues concerning correctional treat-
ment was abandoned. The move from the individualistic and pathological understanding 
of the criminal to a social understanding of crime reformulated the crime problem from 
being one concerned with deviant individuals, framing crime instead as an everywhere 
occurring phenomenon.
A sociological criminology was not something new as such. In Sweden,34 howev-
er, there had been few precursors, but internationally criminology could draw on its 
Durkheimian inheritance maintained by American sociology. Although both Marx and 
Durkheim was early on the scene, the impression still is that a methodological individu-
32 Håkansson 1969 p. 121. My translation.
33 Andersson and Nilsson, Telling the Truth about Crime: The Past and Present of Swedish 
Criminology, Retfærd (2015) pp. 79-93.
34 The first Swedish chair in sociology was established in 1947. It was given to a professor in 
philosophy, Torgny Segerstedt (1908-1999). At Stockholm University the first chair in sociology 
was appointed in 1954 and given to Gunnar Boalt (1910-2000). Both Segerstedt and Boalt wrote 
about crime and helped establish what was termed sociology of crime (kriminalsociologi). This 
was a subject-matter that was a complement to the medical criminology, whose purpose it was to 
prevent crime. Bengtsson and Molander, Den svenska sociologins födelse (Diadalos 1998). Agge 
1955.
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alism, reducing societal facts to the actions of individuals, dominated the human sciences 
in Europe until the 1960s and 1970s, and the breakthrough of macro level criminology 
due to the criticism of the rehabilitative ideal cannot be underestimated.35 Interestingly 
enough, the majority of the researchers that came to dominate the criminological field in 
the Nordic countries from the 1970s and onwards, all had their careers facilitated by their 
criticism of the rehabilitative ideal. But even though the critics stressed the importance 
of social and economic factors as the root causes of crime, it would be the highlighting 
of the significance of the so-called opportunity structure that would come to have a major 
impact on crime policy from the mid-1980s an onwards.
4.4 A New Crime Problem
Relocating the causes of crime from the individual to societal factors also meant a reloca-
tion of the crime problem, moving it from being a pathological individual problem to be-
coming a societal problem instead. As long as crime was caused by individual pathology 
the crime problem was a problem of individuals committing crime. Interestingly enough, 
the researchers of the rehabilitative ideal did not consider petty crimes like shoplifting 
as real crimes. Real crimes were the outcome of sick individuals – shoplifting and other 
types of petty crimes were rather the outcome of rational calculations and could thus not 
be symptoms of a pathological personality. Real crimes, the crimes that were troublesome 
for society, were symptoms of sickness and pathology, and any sign of rationality falsified 
that notion. This also meant that the sudden and sharp rise in crime seen in the post-war 
1950s was something that could not be explained by proponents of the rehabilitative 
ideal. The self-report studies of crime and deviant behaviour that became fashionable 
during the 1950s helped tearing down the assumptions of the rehabilitative ideal. The 
use of questionnaires, distributed to, for example, a high school class, in which the pu-
pils themselves reported crimes committed proved that crime was something, not just 
rather normal, but quite common, at least amongst teenagers. The fact that self-report 
studies showed that acts of crime were common amongst teenagers made the crime prob-
lem depicted by the rehabilitative ideal obsolete.36 Stressing the commonness of crime, 
which was proved through self-report studies, as well as highlighting the importance of 
the crime opportunity structures for the prevalence of crime would become major argu-
ments against the assumptions of the rehabilitative ideal.
35 Even though American sociology had had either a cultural or macro level perspective due to 
amongst others the so-called Chicago school, Lilly et al. point to the fact that the real influence 
of that kind of criminology on policy, even though the major works were written in the 1930s 
and 40s, would not happen until the 1960s. Lilly, Cullen and Ball, Criminological theory: context 
and consequences, 5th ed. (Sage Publications 2011).
36 In Sweden the first self-report studies were made in the late 1960s. Elmhorn, Självdeklarerad 
brottslighet bland skolbarn i Stockholm in Brott och straff, ed. Åkerman (Cavefors 1966).
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The status of crime as primarily a social and societal problem would stand uncon-
tested until the mid-1990s when psychiatry made its sturdy reappearance in the field of 
crime policy.
4.5 Implausible Solutions
What was to become the key political problem with the downfall of the rehabilitative 
ideal was the inability of the new expertise to produce a politically feasible solution. Dis-
carding the class society was not a politically viable solution, not even in Sweden in the 
1970s. Nevertheless, the social, structural and economic factors that the critics framed 
as the root causes of crime and other social problems would have a major impact on 
policy, especially on youth policy, until the mid-1980s. In penal policy, and in particular 
concerning the effects of imprisonment, standpoints like nothing works and prisonisation 
would inform as well as affect policy.37 The conclusion that nothing works, i.e. that no 
measurable effect could be found in the different treatment-measures taken, was used as 
an argument against on the one hand the use of indeterminate sentences and on the other 
hand against the differentiation of punishment due to individual prognoses, but it was 
also used as an argument for strengthening equality before the law. Both the indetermi-
nate sentence and the youth prison (also indeterminate) were abolished in the late 1970s. 
Prisonisation on the other hand refers to a socialisation-process through which pris-
oners learn, accept and adapt to the norms and values of the prison.38 The occurrence of a 
prisonisation process was used as an argument against the use of prison since the process 
in itself made prisoners into recidivists. But abolishing the prison was never an option. 
Even the sternest among prison critics endorsed the claim that; used as a last resort, the 
prison was a general preventive and unavoidable necessary evil.39 The prison was framed 
as something to be used only as a last resort due to its negative consequences, a stand-
point that would prevail in crime policy to the mid-1990s.40
The problem of the absence of expert solutions to the crime problem would increase 
with the solution advocated by the proponents of the neoclassical school of law. This 
because their solution was not so much a solution to crime as a reframing of what law 
and especially penal law should be. For the neoclassicists the objective was to produce a 
37 Robert Martins, the man who coined the phrase nothing works, visited Sweden in the mid-1970s 
invited by the Swedish correctional services. Nilsson 2013.
38 In Sweden it was Ulla Bondeson’s study of the prison that introduced the concept. Bondeson, 
Fången i fångsamhället: socialisationsprocesser vid ungdomsvårdsskola, ungdomsfängelse, 
fängelse och internering (Norstedt 1974). 
39 The downfall of KRUM is said to have been caused by a Marxist overtake of the organisation. 
The Marxists argued for the abolishment of the prison. Nilsson 2013.
40 Andersson and Nilsson 2017.
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penal law that excluded factors and considerations associated with individual prevention, 
and by endorsing due process; the legality principle and proportionate penalties, basic 
adjudication on questions concerning guilt and intent, a socially neutral adjudication 
process would be possible. But changing the rationale of adjudication was not enough, 
the criminalisation structure also had to be changed, i.e. the implicit rationale behind 
the political decision on whether to criminalise an act or not or whether to increase the 
punishment afforded a crime or not. Changing the criminalisation structure in practice 
meant increasing the culpability of economic crimes, while reducing the culpability of 
more traditional acquisitive crimes, since the harmful effects of white-collar crimes, ac-
cording to the neoclassicists, were more serious. The criminalisation structure was also 
supposed to change due to the abandoning of an individual preventive reasoning for a 
due process rationale since this would also transform the penal law from being an instru-
ment in the hands of the state into becoming a limitation upon the discretionary powers 
of the nation state.
Since most social scientists were critical of the prison and the use of it, they con-
sequently also became sceptical of the idea that the criminal justice system should be 
founded on the principles of general prevention. Since much of the crime policy debate of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s came to be about general preventions - pros and cons, the 
debate in large part became internal and of interest only to scholars. Questions raised by 
the newly formulated social scientific criticism of general prevention consisted of ques-
tioning what general prevention actually entailed in in terms of penal policy and as penal 
theory and what the consequences would be in terms of the length of prison sentences 
and the amount of punishment if the criminal justice system was to be founded on its 
principles. Most social scientist were concerned that general prevention would produce 
the same social biases in penal policy as individual prevention had produced and on top 
of that general prevention would also lead to the introduction of very harsh prison sen-
tences. The main argument voiced against general prevention was that politicians would 
not be able to refrain from using the politically ‘easy’ solution of harsher punishment, 
which would then lead to what is today called penal populism.41
4.6 From General Prevention to Just Deserts
The debate between neoclassicist and criminologist on the topic of the pros and cons 
of general prevention did not really come to an end as much as it was transformed into 
something else. It was at BRÅ that the transformation of general prevention into just 
desert started. In 1977, with the publication of a booklet entitled Nytt straffsystem [A 
New Penal System] the question of which penal theory should be the rationale of the 
41 Andersson 2002 p. 102.
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penal system reached its highpoint. A central legal principle was that of proportionate 
punishment. The principle was framed as something that would safeguard against in-
determinate sentences and individualised punishment. But the principle of proportion-
ate punishment of Bentham and Beccaria was instrumental and not intrinsic and as an 
instrumental principle it could be overridden by other considerations such as potential 
deterrence effects due to increased punishment. In a retributive penal theory on the oth-
er hand, the principle of proportionate punishment would be intrinsic and a retributive 
logic fitted well with the criticism voiced by the legal scholars against an adjudication 
process built on individual prevention.42 Instead of the forward-looking rationale of util-
itarian reasoning, i.e. that consequences of future events are that which decide whether 
or not an act is morally right, the retributive rationale builds on assessing the moral 
blameworthiness of an act by judging the intentions of the actor. This backward-looking 
rationale places the intentions and the legal responsibility of the culprit at the core of the 
adjudication process. By placing the assessment of guilt at the centre of legal reasoning 
one also escapes the empirical speculations concerning future consequences of a sanction 
on a culprit, speculations that judges neither had schooling nor competence to do.
The Swedish version of just deserts was termed straffvärde. Straffvärde, or penal value, 
is supposed to be an assessment of the blameworthiness of a criminal act in terms of what 
it deserves as punishment. The argument voiced in Nytt Straffsystem was that the adjudi-
cation process should be guided by the penal value of the crime committed.
5. Part II: The Political Reaction to the Downfall of the Rehabilitative 
Ideal
Until the 1970s, crime policy in Sweden had been a relatively apolitical business. It was 
political in the elementary sense that politicians governed it, but crime policy had not 
been the political arena which it would become in the 1980s and 1990s. Crime policy had 
for the most part been seen as something best left to experts, thus manifesting a scientific 
optimism and a faith in scientific solutions. However, the critics of the rehabilitative ideal 
had, by pointing to the importance of social and economic root causes, shown that it was 
not the sciences, but rather policy, through social reform, that had the capacity to solve 
the crime problem. What the research community could do was to call attention to the 
factors that caused crime, but the task of dealing with these causes was a political one.
42 In 1976 Andrew von Hirsch made a case for a retributive penal theory in his Doing justice. Von 
Hirsch also collaborated with one of Sweden’s more prominent legal scholars, Nils Jareborg. 
Jareborg has been the most influential penal theorist in Sweden during the last 40 years, making 
a strong case for just desert. Von Hirsch, Doing justice: The Choice of punishments (Northeastern 
University press 1976); Von Hirsch and Jareborg, Straff och propotionalitet, Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
Kriminalvidenskab (1987) pp. 300-324.
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The real political impact of the critique of the rehabilitative ideal came at the end of 
the 1970s. Following the general election of 1976, the centre-right opposition was able to 
form a government for the first time in forty-four years. This government faced, amongst 
other things, the task of formulating a crime policy without the support of an undisputed 
scientific foundation. The new scientific truth established, structuring the crime policy 
field, was that the opportunities available to the Ministry of Justice and the penal system, 
in terms of reducing crime, were more or less non-existent. Factors like the prisonisation 
effects and the general acceptance of nothing works greatly limited the arsenal of crime 
policy. These truths became accepted within the political sphere and it was emphasised 
that ‘the criticism has in particular noted those experiences which show that placing offend-
ers in prisons consistently leads to a poor level of rehabilitation and a high level of recidi-
vism’.43
The foremost problem arising due to the downfall was how to legitimise and ra-
tionalise not just crime policy, but also the existence of the penal system. Why have a 
penal system based on prisons, courts and police if it only resulted in negative effects? 
And why pursue a crime policy at all when the solution to the crime problem consisted 
of general welfare policy? The Swedish welfare state was at this time embraced by all the 
political parties of the Swedish parliament, Riksdagen, and the centre-right government 
had no plans on changing this. It became generally accepted during the 1970s that the 
crime problem primarily had social and economic root causes and thus was something 
to be addressed by social and welfare policies. However, the political acceptance of these 
truths, causing the political downfall of the rehabilitative ideal, left the penal system with-
out a scientific legitimisation. The new legitimisation that would come to evolve would be 
a political one produced without any claims to scientific support – a legitimisation that 
discarded empirical support for popular support.
The beginning of a new legitimisation of the penal system started in the late 1970s 
when a policy of prioritisation was formulated. This was a policy based on claiming that 
certain types of crime, namely violent crime, drug crime, white-collar crime and youth 
crime, had priority over other types of crime. The argument made was that the problems 
with these types of crime were so pressing that they had to be dealt with firmly and as 
quickly as possible. The long-term preventive effects of welfare policy thus became polit-
ically implausible. These long-term measures needed time to work, time no longer polit-
ically obtainable. What the prioritised offence categories had in common was a political 
framing of their aetiology; instead of the generally accepted root causes, the prioritised 
crime types got framed as rational actions pursued on rational grounds. Finding inspi-
ration in the general preventive reasoning of the neoclassical school of law, a deterrence 
reasoning found its way into the political argumentation. It was the supposed deterrence 
of patrolling police officers, the threat of punishment as well as early and sharp reactions 
43 Regeringens budgetproposition 1978/79:100, bilaga 5, 13. My translation.
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from the penal system on juvenile delinquency that made the penal system indispensable. 
The supposed deterrent effects of the penal system became the political argument of the 
day. Crime prevention became outlined as something more direct, not including social 
measures. It was looked upon as a work that ‘has to be pursued with the goal of reducing 
crime constituting a more immediate point of departure and [which] cannot be expanded 
to include generally aimed measures of a social nature’.44 In practice, this also meant that 
combating crime, which is primarily what police work consists of, was transformed into 
and reframed as crime prevention – thus, equating the combating of crime with the pre-
vention of crime was a way to give legitimacy and meaning to the penal system.
5.1 Violent Crime as a Catalyst 
The deterrence logic and the promotion of the penal system as a solution to the crime 
problem would find an affiliation in the focus upon violent crime, a focus that has dom-
inated Swedish crime policy since the early 1980s. As with the downfall of the rehabil-
itative ideal the focus on violent crime has its ‘origins’ in the radical 1960s and 1970s. 
Alongside the leftist critique there also emerged a feminist critique of the penal system. 
This critique consisted in the assertion that the unwillingness to seriously address the 
battered women’s problem was due to the warped nature of the patriarchal society. The 
fact that the system allowed the battering of women to go on was viewed as a symptom of 
an unequal social order; a systematic subordination of women, which was just the tip of 
an iceberg of submission. Putting the battered women’s problem on the agenda was thus a 
means to an end – to show that women were second-class citizens due to the fact that the 
political rights and privileges given to them in theory were denied them in practice. For-
mulated in the 1970s this was a harsh and potent critique of crime policy and the penal 
system, a critique that could not be taken lightly. Nonetheless, the political framing of the 
problem was made in terms of a legal shortcoming; the legal system allowed perpetrators 
to walk free because women dropped charges rather than to pursue prosecution. At the 
time, violent offences fell under private prosecution, thus prosecuting someone for a vio-
lent crime required a plaintiff willing to press charges. Accordingly, the political solution 
to the problem was to place violent crimes under public prosecution.45 Hence, the bat-
tered women problem was politically contained and transformed from a structural, social 
and general societal problem into a crime policy problem.46
The introduction of public prosecution would become a measure which provided 
the penal system with greater opportunities to act against violent crime, consequently 
44 Regeringens budgetproposition 1980/81:100, bilaga 5., pp. 11-12. My translation.
45 Regeringens proposition 1981/82:43, Om ändringar i brottsbalken (åtalsregler vid misshandel); 
DsJu 1981:8, Åtalsreglering vid misshandel, Betänkande avgivet av 1977 års sexualbrottskommitté.
46 Andersson 2002 pp. 124-128; Andersson and Nilsson 2017 pp. 130-132.
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strengthening the depiction of the penal system as society’s most central crime preventive 
resource. Placing violent crime under public prosecution also led to a substantial increase 
in the official statistics relating to these crimes, an increase that would come to serve as a 
basis for an even greater political interest. This increase was not however reflected in the 
victim surveys on exposure to crime conducted annually by Statistics Sweden.47
5.2 The Dualisation of the Crime Problem
In the early 1970s decriminalisation as well as reductions in the level of criminalisation 
was regarded as desirable, sound and vital parts of a rational crime policy. The introduc-
tion of a policy of prioritisation would come to change all this; it would come to readdress 
criminalisation, re-criminalisation and penal system measures making these measures 
into potential as well as preferable solutions to the crime problem. This process however 
needed a politically formulated crime problem that built on stressing so-called ‘serious 
crime’ as the major concern for the penal system.48 Refocusing crime policy on ‘serious 
crime’ at the beginning of the 1980s, was a move made in order to provide legitimacy to 
the penal system and the pursued crime policy and ‘serious crimes’ were portrayed as 
so precarious that they could not be left to ‘generally aimed measures of a social nature’. 
However, the focus on ‘serious crime’ led to a division of the crime problem into two 
parts. With the prioritisation of serious crime, other types of crime were pushed into 
the background. This resulted in a division of the crime problem into serious crime and 
everyday crime. As concepts, these framings are unclear and undefined – but it is the 
lack of clarity that makes them so useful. As ‘pictures’ of crime they are clear and vivid 
– everyone ‘knows’ what a serious crime is. Legally, the seriousness of a crime is related 
to the punishment meted out for that act, and some attempts to define serious crime has 
been made, defining acts incorporating sentences of two years imprisonment or more as 
serious crimes is but one example. But the definitions of serious and everyday crimes is 
not a legal one but a political one and thus rhetoric. Looking at the way ‘serious crime’ 
has been defined, we find that it is in terms of offences that breach the state’s monopoly 
over the use of violence, either by involving an element of violence and/or because the 
offences take place in what is referred to as public space. By contrast, ‘everyday crime’ 
comprises those offences to which people are exposed in the course of their daily lives, in 
their homes and cars, offences that are managed by means of various forms of insurance.
47 Whether the number of violent crimes are increasing or not has been a pivotal question since the 
1980s. It has been reported that the number of crimes has increased, but compared to other data 
sources, such as victim surveys conducted annually by Statistics Sweden, this increase seems 
best explained by an increase in the readiness to report violent crimes. But when criminologists 
point this out it is seen as an insensitive response disclaiming the perception of the ‘general 
public’, i.e. of the politicians.
48 Andersson 2002 pp. 121-127.
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What was important with the dualisation of the crime problem was the reformulation 
of the responsibility for the crime problem; whereby the (welfare) state reformulated its 
area of responsibility at the same time as responsibility for certain aspects of the crime 
problem were transferred to what became referred to as the local community. The process; 
initiated at the beginning of the 1980s when the Social Democrats, returning to power,49 
reformulated their crime policy in relation to the downfall of the rehabilitative ideal. 
This process built on emphasising the importance of the local community and individual 
responsibility for crime prevention. Consequently, the fundamental units of governance, 
the state and society, were redefined.
The state shifted from bearing full responsibility for the crime problem as a social 
problem to instead bearing responsibility for the maintenance of order in public space. This 
meant the transformation of the Swedish state from a welfare state into a judicial state 
bearing responsibility primarily for ‘serious crime’. Society, by contrast, became disentan-
gled from the state and became a unit in its own right – a civil society entitled the local 
community. The transformation of the welfare state into a judicial state, complimented 
by the local community, involved a governance where the citizen was to be made to take 
responsibility for those things that happened in the local community. As a result of that, 
the state would take its responsibility by upholding the monopoly over the use of violence 
and over the right to punish, thus framing the penal system as the states’ ‘boundaries’ 
as well as its instrument. The state took as its responsibility to combat ‘serious crime’ in 
every form and to see to it that the criminals were punished. A policy of increased efforts 
on the part of the penal system, in terms of more police and stiffer penalties, was thus 
formulated. 
The local community, on the other hand, was to assume responsibility for ‘everyday 
crime’; local authorities, private individuals and voluntary associations such as neigh-
bourhood watch projects, were to instigate the crime preventive community.50 These al-
tered practices of governance are not unique to crime policy but rather constitute part of 
a general policy in Sweden which focuses an increasing amount of responsibility at the 
local authority level via the municipalisation of areas such as schools and the care of the 
elderly. This is a policy which conveys a desire for higher levels of private involvement 
and responsibility for the individual’s own local community.51
49 DsJu 1985:5, Lokalt samarbete mot brott: Rapport från en hearing i Justitiedepartementet, DsJu 
1996:59, Allas vårt ansvar: Ett nationellt brottsförebyggande program.
50 This policy is still the core of the social democrats crime policy and a new crime preventive 
program was presented during the fall of 2017 entitled Tillsammans mot brott (skr 2016/17:126). 
51 Freedom of choice has been the main argument for deregulating former state monopolies. Many reforms 
have concerned services formerly provided by municipalities such as childcare, care of the elder, but 
also schooling, and medical care. Still financed by taxation, private interests now compete for tax money 
and a marketization of Swedish society is a fact. The aims of these marketizations are an active citizen 
wanting and embracing the responsibility of managing his or her own life on a deregulated market.
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5.3 The General Sense of Justice 
The years 1982 to 1989 also came to see a reframing of the objective of crime policy in 
terms of for whom crime policy and the penal system was for; turning the interest from 
the criminal to the law-abiding citizen. At the core of this was the transformation of 
crime policy: from a welfare crime policy with the task of reforming society and reinte-
grating the criminal to a crime policy with the task of conserving society and protecting 
the law-abiding citizens. This meant making the legitimacy of crime policy dependant on 
how it was perceived by the citizenry, something that was conceptualised as the general 
sense of justice. The general sense of justice was defined as a common moral sentiment 
concerning how seriously criminal acts should be condemned.52 
Soon the political appeal to the general sense of justice merged with an aspiration to 
take an interest in crime as a problem having consequences for people in the course of 
their daily lives. This transition can be seen as a move from an ‘idealistic crime policy’, 
basing its legitimacy on future goals, to a ‘realistic crime policy’, establishing its legiti-
macy by claiming to be a policy that is based in the ‘here and now’. Consequently, crime 
policy altered, from consisting as a forum for the reform of society, transformed into a 
political arena that was ‘directly’ subject to the expectations of society. In the process, 
the ‘crime problem’ shifted from being a matter of societal failure, becoming instead a 
question of protecting honest people from crime. The ‘consumers’ of the penal system in 
consequence moved from the socially disadvantaged perpetrator to the honest citizen. 53
Reframing the object of crime policy in such a way built on separating the legitimacy 
of the penal system and crime policy from questions of quantitative empirical results in 
terms of crime rates or recidivism. Since the failure or success of policy was due to its abil-
ity to meet a general sense of justice, quantitative descriptions of the crime problem were 
replaced by qualitative descriptions. The seriousness of the crime problem was therefore 
no longer necessarily a question of how extensive the problem actually was, but rather 
how it was perceived.54 Thus, rather than being based on its ability to reduce the number 
52 There is little or no support for the idea that there is a general sense of justice in terms of how one 
assesses the graveness of an offence; people judge criminal acts differently. See Jerre and Tham, 
Svenskarnas syn på straff (Stockholms universitet 2010); Brå-rapport 1982:1, Rättsmedvetandet 
i Sverige (Stockholm 1982); Brå-rapport 1996:1, Det allmänna rättsmedvetandet (Stockholm 
1996).
53 Andersson 2002 pp. 134-135.
54 A telling example is violent crime – the perception of the problem advocated through media and 
politics projects a picture of a society in decomposition where violence, if not increasing, at least 
is becoming all the more brutal. When criminologists find little or no support for these doom 
and gloom discourses they themselves get questioned. Attacking criminologists and criminology 
is a common method amongst the editorial pages of rightist media. A little known fact is that the 
rate of homicide/manslaughter in Sweden, rating 1 per 100 000 inhabitants, has held the same 
level for 260 years.
128
Robert Andersson
of crimes committed, the legitimacy of crime policy became based on an appeal to what 
politicians framed as the citizens demands and expectations on crime policy. This has 
shown itself to be a strength, since politicians in this way are able to either disregard facts 
or choose from among available research claims or empirical ‘facts’ in order to legitimise 
their opinions, or they may quite simply dismiss scientific knowledge by referring to the 
public’s sense of justice. By keeping its finger on the pulse of ‘public perceptions’ politics 
is able to access another form of knowledge on crime policy than that produced by the 
experts’ statistical analyses of crime trends. In this way there arises a political knowledge 
of crime policy that is independent of the knowledge of the experts.55
5.4 The General Sense of Justice, Penal Value and Social Engineering
A driving force in the process towards legitimizing crime policy by referring to the gen-
eral sense of justice, was the sanctioning system reform initiated by the downfall of the 
rehabilitative ideal. Enacted in 1989, the reform meant the introduction of two entire-
ly new chapters to the penal code, replacing the one paragraph that prior to this had 
guided the adjudication process’ meeting out of punishment. 56 Establishing penal value 
and proportionate punishment as the grounds for meeting out punishment meant a firm 
regulation of the adjudication process.57 The meeting out of punishment consists of es-
tablishing what an act deserved in terms of punishment by way of determining, vis-à-vis 
blameworthiness, the concrete penal value of that act. 
Nonetheless, it is not the courtroom use of penal value, but the political use of it that 
has furthered a crime policy based on qualitative assessments of the crime problem. Pe-
nal value was also to be used as bases for deciding whether to criminalise an act or wheth-
er to re-criminalize it (in terms of increasing the punishment). Here, penal value became 
a guideline in terms of the assumed abstract penal value of the act under evaluation. In 
sum, this entailed the abstract penal value was of an act was nothing more than ‘harmful-
ness’ of said act. Superseding preventive aspects the argument regarding criminalisation 
has been turned into a predominantly emotional assessment dressed up as morals. Crim-
inalization being a political question soon meant the linking of the abstract penal value to 
the general sense of justice – making the blameworthiness of the act to be criminalised a 
55 Andersson 2002 pp. 136-138.
56 Government Bill 1987/88:120, Changes in the penal code etc. (determining sentences and choices 
of sanction etc.).
57 Interestingly enough Christie, one of the instigators of the Nordic critique of the rehabilitative 
ideal, has criticized just deserts as something that will lead to a computer model of adjudication, 
i.e. that the exclusion of discretion or in Christies view, the human factor, will lead to an 
adjudication that does not take humanitarian aspects into considerations. Von Hirsch, on the 
other hand, has argued that limiting discretion is pivotal if one wants to decrease punishment in 
the US.
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question for said sense. On par with the general sense of justice, penal value has come to 
denote a crime policy that is largely normative and qualitative, thus absolving politicians 
from being responsible for the consequences of policy, reframing crime policy as an emo-
tional venture playing on the feelings of the voters. Social engineering has accordingly 
been replaced by a moral engineering. 
6. Concluding Remarks
The link between problems and preferred solutions is itself a construction that trans-
forms an ideological preference into a rational governmental action.58 
One way of analysing the trajectory described above is in terms of a transformation of 
Swedish crime policy from social engineering to moral engineering. This is a transforma-
tion built on redefining the knowledge legitimising crime policy, moving from a crimi-
nological knowledge, built on quantitative and empirical aspects on policy, to a qualita-
tive moral knowledge. Even though macro level criminology facilitated the downfall of 
the rehabilitative ideal in Swedish crime policy, it did not manage to install itself as the 
knowledge legitimising crime policy. All the while the new jurisprudence of just deserts 
furthered and expanded a political autonomy towards the scientific knowledge-produc-
tion by stressing moral considerations as central to both adjudication and criminalisa-
tion. Building crime policy on the general sense of justice brought about an autonomous 
crime policy, a policy no longer focusing factual results, addressing instead the conceived 
results. A policy were the best possible result is bringing the pursued policy in accordance 
with general sense of justice, thus transforming crime policy into a moral engineering 
practice aiming at installing the right moral condemnation of crime.
In terms of governing this brings about a new way of governing and a new govern-
mentality. The care for and optimizing of the population, central to the rehabilitative 
ideal, has been replaced by a care of the law-abiding citizen. Instead of an excluding 
inclusion, where the divergent subjects were separated from the heard only to be re-
turned to the flock once ‘cured’, present-day Swedish crime policy builds on a including 
exclusion, whereby we learn how to belong to society by morally identifying the ones 
who doesn’t belong. This move is visualised in the replacement of social engineering by a 
moral engineering – a practice built on making us aware of who has a, and who has not, 
a rightful access to society. Consequently, crime policy is no longer about integration and 
reintegration. Instead it has turned into a question of deservedness.
58 Edelman, Constructing the political spectacle (University of Chicago Press 1988) p. 22.
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A different governmentality also becomes visible in the changed relation to knowl-
edge. The liberal governmentality has historically been dependent on scientific knowl-
edge both to define the object of governing as well as the production of knowledge on 
how to govern those objects to the best of means. Scientific knowledge seems, since the 
downfall of the rehabilitative ideal, to have taken a different position. Its role in the prob-
lematisations of crime, of criminality and of the criminal has changed. The scientific fo-
cus, adopted by criminology as well as jurisprudence, during the rehabilitative ideal was 
that of the criminal, his drives and motives. The critics of the rehabilitative ideal lost 
sight of the criminal and focused instead on either moral aspects of the act or on the root 
causes behind the act. As a consequence, it was left to politics to problematise crime. The 
result became a problematisation of crime that moved from framing crime either as a 
sign of maladjustment or as a sign of societal insufficiencies that needed to be ‘cured’, to 
framing crime as a threat against society and social order.
Consequently, crime policy has come to be about protecting society and its law-abid-
ing citizens from crime. Crime is thereby nothing stemming from society but something 
threatening it, thus crime is to be combated and punished and the criminal to adjust or 
perish. The rationale of the rehabilitative ideal and social engineering, i.e. to use crime 
and its occurrence as a means of reforming society, is thus lost and crime is solely looked 
upon as a threat to be dealt with. 
